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STATE EX REL. SWANN V. PACK: SELF-
ENDANGERMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
For many years there has been some controversy over
whether an individual has the right to endanger himself if his
conduct threatens no direct harm to others. This issue has
come up in a number of contexts including committing sui-
cide,' wearing a helmet while riding a motorcycle, 2 engaging in
endurance contests,3 and refusing a medically indicated blood
transfusion.4 Recently it was raised again when the Holiness
Church of God in Jesus Name in the mountains of Tennessee
went to court over the right of its members to drink poison. On
September 8, 1975, the Supreme Court of Tennessee handed
down its decision in that case in State ex rel. Swann v. Pack5
enjoining the members of the sect from handling snakes or
drinking poison because such activities constitute a common
law public nuisance.6
I. DIVERGENT PHILOSOPHIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
The debate over the validity of self-endangerment legisla-
tion is most easily understood through a brief comparison of
two theories of social organization. Since these represent polar
extremes, they can serve to establish a frame of reference.
At one extreme is the social model emphasizing individual
See, e.g., State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961); Stiles v. Clifton Springs
Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
2 E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7 (1968), and cases cited in note 38 infra.
TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-2207 (1939).
See, e.g., cases cited in notes 73-81 infra.
527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1429 (1976).
A public nuisance is defined as "a condition of things which is prejudicial to the
health, comfort, safety, property, sense of decency, or morals of the citizens at large,
resulting either from an act not warranted by law, or from neglect of a duty imposed
by law." 58 AM. JuR. 2d Nuisances § 7 (1971). This is the definition cited by the court.
527 S.W.2d at 113. In addition, the court cites Yarbrough v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.
Co., 11 Tenn. App. 456 (1930) which defines a common law nuisance as follows:
[a] nuisance in legal parlance, extends to everything that endangers life or
health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs
the reasonable or comportable use of property.
527 S.W.2d at 113.
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liberties. This theory, based on natural law,7 is that society is
an aggregate of individuals who have certain natural and inher-
ent rights to life, liberty, and property which the social com-
pact' was established to protect; the social compact is merely
superimposed on these rights, which are the ultimate author-
ity. Government's role is "strictly fiduciary in character...
designed to make more secure and more readily available rights
which antedate it and which would survive it."' In this model,
government plays an essentially negative role since freedom is
defined as the absence of governmental restraints on one's nat-
ural rights."° Only when a person's acts are directly harmful to
others does society have the right to intervene. In this model,
there is one inviolable area of liberty: that of self-concern. 1
At the opposite extreme is a paternalistic social model.
Here the theory is that there are no inherent individual rights
and that all personal rights derive from a social compact which
is the original source of the rights to life, liberty, and property.
In this model, the state of nature is characterized as dangerous
and competitive, a state where only the most aggressive sur-
vive. Thus in the natural state, man is not free; he can become
free only to the extent that the state through its laws makes
him so by protecting him from the state of nature. Liberty is
not abridged by the state but is established and created by it.
I Natural law includes the idea that in a state of nature, such nature as yet being
pure and undefaced by man's baser passions, there exist principles to the guidance of
human conduct. Included with these principles of conduct are various natural rights:
rights which are self evident, inherent in man and which exist independently of en-
acted law. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149 and 42 HARv. L. REV. 365 (1928).
1 The social compact for purposes of this comment can be defined as the agree-
ment or contract individuals enter into when they form a society. When the social
compact becomes highly sophisticated and takes on a character independent of the
people, it is known as "the state" or "government." Id.
I Id. at 389.
10 See generally MURPHY, POLITICAL THEORY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 204-15
(1968). Murphy explains that when government's function is to encourage people to
better themselves and society through laws, this can be described as government
taking a "positive" role. In contrast, where government is conceptualized to be an
arbiter in protecting people from each other only when necessary, it can be said that
government takes a "negative" role.
" For the classic statements of this theory of society, see JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATIS ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1966 ed. 1690) and JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in
UTIL=AIANiSM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Am. ed. 1951).
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Government plays a positive role in that it insures that people
are protected and secure. Thus in this model, the social com-
pact, the welfare of the people considered en masse, is the first
priority and individual freedom is secondary."2
Encompassed in this paternalistic model of society is the
idea that since the welfare of the people as a whole is the
ultimate interest to be protected, the state can regulate to this
end with few restraints. 13 The paternalistic power of the govern-
ment as guardian of the general welfare is recognized in our
society as the police power of a state. The police power is
usually described as the broad, inherent power of the legisla-
ture to prescribe regulations which promote the education,
health, safety, peace, morals and general welfare of the com-
munity.14 Since the welfare of the people as a whole is the
original and ultimate interest,15 the police power extends even
to prohibiting people from engaging in activities that directly
endanger only themselves."
In contrast, the libertarian position proposes that because
men have certain natural rights which the government serves
only to protect, the power of a state to regulate is always lim-
1" For the classic statements of this view of society, see THoMAs HOBBES, THE
ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND Po1rnc (2d ed. 1969) (1st ed. published 1889) and J.
STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALrrY, FRATERrY (1873).
13 Corwin, supra note 7, explains at 390 that when the first ten amendments to
the United States Constitution were written, these restraints on governmental power
were written into the compact.
1" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
See also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 174 (1956).
IS This idea is expressed in the legal maxim, "salus populi est suprema lex," "the
welfare of the people is the supreme law." 78 C.J.S. Salus (1952).
1' H.L.A. Hart, a modern philosopher endorsing this paternalistic model, explains
the rationale of protecting people from themselves in this way:
[Platernalism - the protection of people against themselves - is a perfectly
coherent policy. Indeed, it seems very strange in mid-twentieth century to
insist upon this, for the wane of laissez-faire since Mill's day is one of the
commonplaces of social history, and instances of paternalism now abound
in our law, criminal and civil.
It is too often assumed that if a law is not designed to protect one man from
another its only rationale can be that it is designed to punish moral wicked-
ness. . . . But it is certainly intelligible, both as an account of the original
motives inspiring such legislation and as the specification of an aim widely
held to be worth pursuing, to say that the law is here concerned with
suffering. . . rather than with the immorality. ...
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MoRALrrY 31-32, 34 (1963).
19761
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ited by its function of protecting individual rights whether or
not the right is protected by the Constitution specifically.
7
Thus a state regulating for the public good can restrict man's
individual rights only to prevent harm to others. 8 To protect a
person from himself or to regulate him for his own good is not
a sufficient warrant for the state to restrict personal liberty. 9
II. MANIFESTATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONFLICT IN Two
AREAS OF SELF-ENDANGERMENT LAW
The debate between the libertarian and paternalistic
,7 Justice Chase expressed this idea succinctly in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 387-388 (1798):
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is
absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the State. The people
of the United States erected their constitutions, or forms of government, to
establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of
liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence. The pur-
poses for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms
of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power,
they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle
flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man
should be compelled to do what the laws do not require, nor to refrain from
acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legisla-
ture cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital
principles in our free republican governments, which will determine and
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was
established. An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a right-
ful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law in governments
established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be deter-
mined by the nature of the power on which it is founded.
S "Their [the legislature's] power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the
public good of the society." JOHN LOCKE, supra note 11, § 135. See also Corwin, supra
note 7, at 392, explaining that Locke's insistence on public good as the only legitimate
goal of governmental action is in line with his main trend of thought as it represents a
limitation on legislative freedom of action in favor of individual rights.
19 John Stuart Mill writes that;
IT]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, supra note 11, at 95-96. See also Comment, Limiting
the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. Cm. L. REv.
605 (1969-70).
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views continues today. The controversy regarding the extent to
which a state may restrict personal liberty when an individ-
ual's conduct endangers only himself and when no constitu-
tional guarantee is involved has arisen in a modem context in
the split of authority on at least two issues: suicide and motor-
cycle helmets."0
A. Suicide
At common law suicide was clearly a crime." The self-
destructive act, to qualify as suicide, had to be intentional,2
voluntary, 3 and deliberate.2 4 But even then, suicide was
"something more than self-sought or self-inflicted death. It was
a species of crime or wickedness, something wrong, a kind of
self-murder. 2 5 Because of this, suicide resulted in forfeiture of
all property and ignominious burial, a harsh treatment which
still prevailed in the 19th century.
26
2 Although consensual crimes such as possession of narcotics, gambling, prostitu-
tion, and homosexuality fall within the rubric of self-endangerment legislation, they
are not dealt with here for a number of reasons. First, the criminal laws against them
are regularly upheld without much question. Second, moral issues are so intertwined
it is difficult to examine these laws purely for the social philosophy involved. Third,
these laws are particularly subject to ad terrorem arguments, i.e., if everyone did it
society would collapse. Finally, these laws are the subjects of treatises in themselves
and are beyond the scope of this comment.
Also not within the scope of this comment are the various consumer protection
measures. These regulations-the requirement that cars come equipped with seatbelts
for example-are distinguishable from self-endangerment legislation on the ground
that they do not restrict the individual's freedom for his benefit but restrict instead
the freedom of the manufacturer or distributor of the product.
2Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1180 (1934).
" Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1947)
(citing Penal Law, Consol. Laws ch. 40, § 2300).
21 Muzenick v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union of United States, 119
P.2d 504 (Kan. 1941).
24 Parker v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 232 S.W. 708 (Mo. 1921).
11 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 1 (1953). See also O'Sullivan, The Ethics of Suicide, 2 CATH.
LAW. 147 (1956).
21 [T]he law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man
hath a power to destroy life but by commission from God, the author of it;
and as the suicide is guilty of a double offense, one spiritual in evading the
prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence un-
called for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in the
preservation of all his subjects, the law has, therefore, ranked this among the
highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony committed
on one's self.
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 189 (21st ed. 1856).
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While the common law was clear on the criminality of
suicide, modem law is confused.27 Two states have upheld con-
victions for attempted suicide where there was no statute defin-
ing suicide as a crime, based on its status as a crime at common
law.2 Other jurisdictions, however, have held that absent such
a statute, suicide is not a crime."9 One state equivocates by
defining suicide not as an indictable crime but as "unlawful."30
Commentators3' and courts 2 have analogized the issues of
suicide law to those of self-endangerment law, yet the analogy
is defective for a number of reasons. First, moral and religious
values are intertwined in suicide law and are not easily isolated
to reveal the social philosophy involved. Second, suicide is not
an issue which is frequently raised directly. Third, and most
important, suicide is distinguishable from the great mass of
other self-harming conduct such as taking narcotics or partici-
pating in endurance contests33 because suicide involves death
as the specific goal, whereas the goal of other self-harming
conduct is not death but usually pleasure or profit. Thus a
better issue with which to examine the actual arguments re-
garding the extent to which a state has power to forbid a person
to endanger himself are the cases interpreting the state statutes
requiring motorcyclists and passengers to wear helmets while
operating their cycles.
21 See generally Schulman, Suicide and Suicide Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54
A.B.A.J. 855 (Sept. 1968).
21 State v. LaFayette, 188 A. 918 (C.P.N.J. Camden County 1937); State v. Willis,
121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961).
" Iowa v. Campbell, 251 N.W. 717 (Iowa 1933). Additionally, there is conflict over
the status of attempted suicide. At least three states have held that since suicide is
not a crime, attempted suicide logically cannot be a crime. May v. Pennell, 64 A. 885
(Me. 1906); State v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162 (1870) [cited in Schulman, supra note 27,
at 858]; Grace v. Texas, 69 S.W. 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902). Three states have
resolved the problem by enacting statutes providing specifically that attempted sui-
cide is a crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-25.6 (1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 812
(1951); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.80.020 (1909).
Wallace v. State, 116 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1953).
See, e.g., Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48
(1954).
' See, e.g., State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969); American Motorcycle Ass'n
v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. App. 1968); State ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d
99 (Tenn. 1975).
3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2207 (1939). This statute makes it a misdemeanor to
participate in any type of physical endurance contest.
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B. Motorcyclists and Helmets
New York adopted the first motorcycle helmet statute in
1966.11 Many states followed New York's example 5 and by July
1967 the helmet requirement was classified as a federal "mini-
mum standard" by the Secretary of Transportation to which
all state highway safety programs were to conform." Despite
the federal endorsement, these statutes have been attacked as
unconstitutional exercises of the police power37 at least 24
times3 While the majority of jurisdictions has upheld these
helmet statutes, at least three courts have voided them as un-
constitutional. 9
31 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381(6) (McKinney 1969). The statute reads, "It shall
be unlawful. . . for any person to operate or ride upon a motorcycle unless he wears
a protective helmet of a type approved by the commissioner. . ....
E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.658(d) (1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
90, § 7 (Supp. 1968).
3' SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR STATE HIGH-
WAY SAFETY PROGRAMS, H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1967).
The police power is the broad, inherent power of the legislature to regulate for
the education, health, safety, peace and general welfare of the community. See cases
cited note 14 supra. It is clear that requiring cyclists to wear helmets is a reasonable
means to the end of promoting personal safety. The means the state legislatures chose
is not under challenge, the end is. The issue is whether the legislature has a legitimate
concern in curtailing personal injury when that injury threatens no direct harm to
others. Is this a valid goal of the police power? While the paternalists would answer
that promoting personal safety is a valid goal for legislators, the libertarians would
argue that unless the conduct involved poses a direct threat to others, it is not a
legitimate concern for the state.
- Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F.Supp. 486 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118
(Colo. 1970); State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969); State v. Lee, 465 P.2d 573
(Hawaii 1970); People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 1969); Everhardt v. City of New
Orleans, 217 So.2d 400 (La. 1969); Commonwealth v. Howie, 238 N.E.2d 373 (Mass.
1968); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968);
State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1970); State v. Krammes, 252 A.2d 223 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1969); State v. Mele, 247 A.2d 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968); People v.
Newhouse, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968); People v. Carmichael, 288
N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968), rev'g, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sp. Sess. 1967);
People v. Bielmeyer, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967); State v. Anderson, 166
S.E.2d 49 (N. C. 1969); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969); State v. Craig,
249 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866 (Franklin Mun.
Ct. Ohio 1969); State v. Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1969); Arutanoff v. Metropolitan
Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 448 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1969); Ex parte
Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Solomon, 260 A.2d 377 (Vt.
1969); State v. Laitinen, 459 P.2d 789 (Wash. 1969); Bisenius v. Karns, 165 N.W.2d
377 (Wis. 1969).
1' American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968),
which the same court declined to follow in People of the City of Adrian v. Poucher,
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Most of the courts which uphold these statutes do so on
two grounds. The first is based on the threat of direct injury to
others. This is the so-called "missile hazard theory," derived
from the argument that a cyclist hit on the head by a flying
object would likely lose control of his cycle and prove dangerous
to others. 0 While this argument is speculative and empirically
tenuous,4 it is not challengeable as an illegitimate goal of the
police power even under the libertarian point of view, as it
invokes the potential of direct danger to others.
Courts upholding the statutes without invoking the poten-
tial of direct danger to others under the missile hazard theory
usually fall back on the threat of indirect injury to others, the
rationale of secondary harm. 2 The most frequently mentioned
secondary harm is the welfare cost analysis;43 since a cyclist
240 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866 (Franklin Mun.
Ct., Ohio 1969); State v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d (Ill. 1969). See Note: Motorcycle Helmets
and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIO STATE L.J. 355 (1969).
See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970).
11 See, e.g., Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Arutnoff
v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 448 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn.
1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I. 1968); State v. Fetterly,
456 P.2d 996, 997 (Ore. 1969).
" One difficulty with the above rationale [the missile hazard theory]
is that it lacks cogency. The cyclists simply do not believe it; they consider
it patently unrealistic [citing Reply Brief for Plaintiffs and Appellants at 4,
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich.App. 1968)].
They point out that it represents nothing more than judicial notice of a
subject about which most judges have little knowledge or experience.
Motorcycle, supra note 39, at 367.
42 The theory of secondary harm is that other people suffer as a result of the actor's
injury. For example, when the breadwinner is incapacitated, the family loses its means
of support and the family suffers. Furthermore, if the family is then forced to go on
the welfare rolls, society suffers. Thus while the conduct may appear to harm only the
actor himself, there are actually identifiable injuries to others which flow from the
actor's conduct. The indirect injuries to others are the secondary harms.
It is interesting to note that the majority of efforts to prohibit conduct which,
on first glance, appears to harm only the actor himself are rationalized as a
means of preventing secondary harms, rather than as efforts to protect peo-
ple from their own folly . . . . [Wlhere the person to be protected from
himself is not under age, "ill," or a member of another group with a similar
claim to sympathy . . . society acts for its own benefit rather than his. It
must, therefore, still be able to point to a secondary harm to justify the law.
Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1065 at 1068, and note
9 at 1068.
11 State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677, 679 (N.D. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v.
Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968).
COMMENTS
drives in a society committed to prevent people from dying of
their injuries, the state may have to assume the expense of
treating the cyclist if he is injured but not killed outright. Thus
society believes it can demand that the cyclist do his share to
protect himself. Additionally, the cyclist's injury or death may
force society to assume the cost of his neglected financial sup-
port obligations to others. The reduction of damages rationale
is another frequently cited secondary harm." It theorizes that
if a cyclist is injured because of another driver's negligence and
brings a civil action to recover damages, compensatory dam-
ages will be lower when a helmet is worn since the injury of a
cyclist wearing a helmet will most likely be less severe than
that of a cyclist not wearing a helmet. Thus this position views
the problem from the standpoint of a negligent defendant in a
tort suit. The helmet requirement serves to protect these defen-
dants from paying unnecessarily high damage awards to the
cyclist with an unprotected head. These arguments all identify
people other than the actor who will suffer from his injury.
State taxpayers contributing to the welfare rolls, the cyclist's
dependents, and the defendants in a tort action are all seen as
potential victims of a cyclist's refusal to wear a helmet.
However, several decisions have upheld helmet statutes on
the basis that a state can protect an individual from himself
without the justification of any direct or even any secondary
harm to others. 5 These decisions are based broadly on the ar-
gument that the whole is no more than the sum of the parts;
that is, as society is only composed of individuals banding to-
gether, each of these individuals is a subject of concern to so-
ciety in its efforts to thrive. Thus the state as steward of the
whole has a legitimate interest in the viability of the individual
citizen." The courts upholding the helmet statutes, and partic-
11 Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1970).
13 State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969); State v. Mele, 247 A.2d 176 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1968); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969). While the latter two
decisions both discuss the potential of direct or indirect harm to others, this is merely
lip service, and both opinions state that even if these threats were absent, the legisla-
ture would still have the power to require cyclists to wear helmets. In contrast to this
circuitous approach, the Florida Supreme Court grabbed the bull by the horns and
stated, "[W]e ought to admit frankly that the purpose of the helmet is to preserve
the life and health of the cyclist. . . ." State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1969).
11 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898):
1976]
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ularly those courts doing so without appeal either to direct or
to secondary harm rationales, are heirs to the paternalistic
model; as the whole society is the crucial value, restriction of
personal freedom to promote the whole is acceptable. This is
the philosophy under attack by libertarians.
Several influential jurisdictions have voided the helmet
statutes as unconstitutional exercises of the police power,
adopting the libertarian position that if the conduct involved
threatens no direct harm to others, it cannot be legitimately
proscribed by the legislature. The Michigan Court of Appeals
was the first court to do so4" although its position later
changed."8 The Michigan statute4" was challenged on various
provisions of the Michigan constitution" and on "the due pro-
cess, equal protection and right of privacy provisions of the
ninth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the
United States." 51 The court found that the statute did have "a
relationship to the protection of the individual motorcyclist
from himself, but not to the public health, safety and wel-
fare. ' 512 Thus the court refused to decide by "stretching our
imagination"53 to find such a relationship, and as individual
The State still retains an interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be.
The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individ-
ual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must
suffer.
11 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
This case is noted in 18 DRAKE L. REV. 124 (1968); 54 IowA L. REv. 382 (1968); 45 N.D.L.
REV. 295 (1968-69); 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 339 (1968-69); 37 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 385 (1969);
71 W. VA. L. REV. 191 (1968-69); and 1969 Wis. L. REV. 320.
IS The same Michigan Court of Appeals later re-examined the identical issue, the
constitutionality of requiring cyclists to wear helmets, and declined to follow their
ruling in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids. In People of the City of Adrian v.
Poucher, 240 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. App. 1976), the court found a municipal ordinance
requiring cyclists to wear crash helmets constitutional as a valid exercise of the police
power. The court stated, "We are convinced that the reasoning of this Court in
American Motorcycle Association ...was incorrect and decline to follow it." 240
N.W.2d at 300.
" MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.658(d)(1967).
MICH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 17, 23.
158 N.W.2d at 73.
52 Id. at 76.
Id. In one of the more realistic approaches to the problem, the court in a footnote
(n. 11) quoted Judge Kaufman explaining that:
Here it just affects the individual, and while the individual is a member of
the general public, his activity in doing what has been determined by the
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safety alone did not appear a sufficient reason to restrict per-
sonal liberty, the statute was struck down. 4 In voiding the
helmet statute, the court did not base its decision on any con-
stitutional provision. Thus it appears that the Michigan court
was the first court to recognize a right not enumerated in the
Constitution to endanger oneself. This is the first evidence of
this right in the context of motorcycle helmets.
The second court to invalidate a helmet statute was the
Supreme Court of Illinois" in a case in which the statute re-
quired both a helmet and goggles or a transparent shield."
While claiming to express no opinion on the windshield-goggles
provision, the court implied that this requirement was accepta-
ble since its purpose was to prevent a cyclist from being blinded
by flying objects, losing control, and hurting others. The court
considered the helmet requirement directly and found that:
The manifest function of the headgear requirement in issue
is to safeguard the person wearing it-whether it is the opera-
tor or a passenger-from head injuries. Such a laudable pur-
pose, however, cannot justify the regulation of what is essen-
tially a matter of personal safety.57
The statute was voided as a violation of the Illinois constitution
and the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
5
1
legislature to be a crime cannot in any way affect the general public unless
one would stretch his imagination.
" Id. Interestingly enough, when the court declined to follow this reasoning in
People of the City of Adrian v. Poucher, 240 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), they
did a complete about-face in their philosophical orientation. While the court in the
original case was full of the language of libertariansism, in People of the City of Adrian
they state:
We are not persuaded that the "right to be let alone," at least in this case,
or the fact that the legislation tends to protect particular individuals from
their own folly warrants the conclusion that the measure is not a valid exer-
cise of the police power. Nor can we say that a measure which seeks to protect
a large number of individuals does not advance the health, safety or general
welfare of the public in general.
240 N.W.2d at 300.
People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d 149 (111. 1969).
" ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 951/2, par. 189c (a) provides, "The operator of a
motorcycle and every passenger thereon must wear protective headgear . . . ." ILL.
REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 951/2, par. 189c (b) provides, "In addition, the operator of a
motorcycle and every passenger thereon shall be protected by glasses, goggles or a
transparent shield."
1, 250 N.E.2d at 151.
"ILL. CONsT. art II, § 2 (1870); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. That the court used both
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Approximately 3 months after the Illinois decision, an
Ohio municipal court also voided a helmet statute. 9 The court
took a classic libertarian approach and held that without a
clear and specific public need, i.e. unless others are directly
endangered, police power cannot restrict an individual's free-
dom. The court found that, "[i]ncluded in man's 'liberty' is
the freedom to be as foolish, foolhardy or reckless as he may
wish, so long as others are not endangered thereby. The State
of Ohio has no legitimate concern with whether or not an indi-
vidual cracks his skull while motorcycling; that is his personal
risk."60
While there have been other decisions invalidating helmet
statutes," the three discussed above confront the controversy
most directly.12 These courts adhere to the libertarian tenet
that the police power of a state is always limited in restricting
personal freedom to situations where the conduct being pro-
scribed endangers others even when that freedom is not pro-
tected by a specific constitutional guarantee.
While the helmet statutes have been challenged on a num-
ber of constitutional bases,63 two of the three decisions exam-
this state constitution clause and the due process clause of the federal constitution
evidences their groping for a sufficient basis on which to invalidate the statute. They
apparently did not feel as confident as the Michigan court in merely voiding the statute
without citing a constitutional basis.
, State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866 (Franklin Mun. Ct. Ohio 1969).
Id. at 872.
People v. Smallwood, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967).
,2 The reluctance of courts to confront the question of the extent of the state's
police power without the support of any direct or secondary harms to others is interest-
ingly revealed in a federal court decision upholding a state statute. In State v. Eitel,
227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969), the Florida Supreme Court had construed a two part statute
like Illinois', requiring both goggles and a helmet, as constitutional. The Florida court
found the goggles requirement constitutional as it would prevent the cyclist from being
blinded, losing control, and injuring others; and the court found the helmet require-
ment constitutional as being within the law's basic purpose to protect the individual
rider's life and health. When the case was subsequently taken to federal district court,
Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.Fla. 1970), the federal court upheld the state
court's decision but disagreed on the rationale. They found that the purpose of the
helmet requirement was not to protect the individual but to prevent harm to other
motorists. Having thus justified the statute on the presumably sounder basis of direct
harm to others, the federal court stated that, "The Florida Court's remarks regarding
the helmet requirements were unnecessary and unfortunate." Id. at 489.
63 See, e.g., Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1970), where the statute was chal-
lenged as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, an unconstitutional
burden on freedom of movement and the right to travel, and special legislation which
COMMENTS
ined above voided them because they violated state constitu-
tions"4 and the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. While the courts were not more specific, presum-
ably they.were voiding the statutes as deprivations of liberty
without due process of law. Thus a very vague and general
provision of the fourteenth amendment, the due process clause,
was used to limit the state's police power. In contrast, the
paternalistic position is that there are no restrictions on the
legitimate goals of the police power except those that are spe-
cifically enumerated in the Constitution. Those holding to the
paternalistic philosophy believe that a statute cannot be chal-
lenged on the due process clause without a specific constitu-
tional guarantee to justify the challenge. 5 In light of the
paternalistic-libertarian dispute, it is informative to examine
the courts' interpretations of the extent to which it is permissi-
ble for the police power to prohibit an individual from endan-
gering his life when a specific constitutional guarantee is in-
volved.
III. SELF-ENDANGERMENT LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Blood Transfusion Cases
The members of the religious group known as Jehovah's
Witnesses generally refuse blood transfusions even when they
are essential to life. Their belief, based on two Biblical pas-
sages, 6 is that transfusions violate Jehovah's law."7 A problem
was unconstitutional because it discriminated against a certain class of individuals;
Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 448 S.W.2d 408
(Tenn. 1969), where the helmet statute was challenged as being generally beyond the
police power, a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and a violation
of the right to privacy found in the ninth and fourteenth amendments.
"ILL. CONsT. art. II, § 2 (1870); OHIo CONST. art. I, § 1.
" Linde, Without Due Process, 49 ORE L. REV. 125 (1970). Linde's thesis is that,
No state law can be attacked as lacking support in "police power." There is
no constitutional source of "police power" or any other category of state
power. State legislative power is plenary subject to constitutional limita-
tions. An attack on the validity of a state law phrased as a claim that it
exceeds "police power" should be dismissed unless and until it is restated
in terms of a specific constitutional limitation said to have been violated.
Id. at 184.
" Leviticus 3:17 (King James): "It shall be a perpetual statute for your genera-
tions throughout all your dwelling, that ye eat neither fat nor blood." Acts 15:29 (King
1976]
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arises when doctors decide a transfusion is essential, yet the
patient or his relatives refuse permission for that transfusion.
The question then becomes whether the courts can compel an
individual to receive a transfusion for his own good when this
treatment violates a central tenet of his religious belief. Before
analyzing the courts' decisions, some background is helpful to
establish perspective.
It is generally acknowledged that where first amendment
rights are at issue, any restriction of personal liberty must be
scrutinized carefully for absolute necessity." The Supreme
Court has established general guidelines as to when religious
freedom can be abridged. In an early decision," the Court es-
tablished the belief/action dichotomy that while freedom to
believe is absolute, actions, even though religiously motivated,
can be restricted to protect the general welfare. Various tests
have been established since then to determine when the threat
to the general welfare is severe enough to necessitate restriction
of religious freedom. In Thomas v. Collins,70 the Court held that
attempted restrictions must be justified by clear public interest
when the general welfare is threatened not doubtfully or re-
motely but by clear and present danger. In Sherbert v.
Verner,7" the Court said any restriction must be justified by a
compelling state interest exhibiting more than a mere rational
relationship to some colorable state interest; only the gravest
abuses endangering paramount interests give occasion to limit
James): "That ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things
strangled, and from fornication: from which if ye keep yourselves, ye shall do well. Fare
ye well."
a? See generally Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10
CATH. LAW. 212 (1964).
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944), which refers to "the preferred place
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by
the First Amendment [citations omitted]. That priority gives these liberties a sanct-
ity and sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Id. at 530. Accord, U.S. v. Della-
pia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2nd Cir. 1970): "Because we are dealing with the first amendment,
our sensitivity to incursions upon privacy must be a quantum greater than it would
be were we reviewing laws prohibiting the possession of marihuana, People v. Aguiar,
257 Cal.App.2d 597, 65 Cal.Rptr. 171 (Ct.App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970, 89
S.Ct. 411, 21 L.Ed.2d 383 (1968), or requiring motorcyclists to don helmets, American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich.App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968)." Id. at 1257.
" Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
7- 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
71 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
[Vol. 65
COMMENTS
these rights. In the most recent decision on this point,
Wisconsin v. Yoder,'72 the Court established a balancing test in
which state interests must be searchingly examined to see if
they are of sufficient magnitude to overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion.
While these tests are not clear in themselves, they do evi-
dence the Supreme Court's great concern and solicitude for the
right to freedom of religion. The treatment accorded this deli-
cate area in the blood transfusion cases reflects this concern.
At first glance there seems to be a split of authority, mirroring
that in the helmet cases, as to whether Jehovah's Witnesses
may be compelled to take blood transfusions.73 However, when
examined closely the cases holding that there is judicial power
to compel transfusions have always involved one of two types
of extenuating circumstances. The first is that the patient is a
parent of minor children 4 or is a pregnant woman.75 Here the
courts have recognized that the welfare of children, particu-
larly in the case of the pregnant patient, is endangered by the
parent's refusal of a transfusion. In this situation, courts will
step in and order a transfusion over the patient's wishes out of
concern for the minor or unborn dependents.76 The second cir-
72 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
, See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
" See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 237
U.S. 978 (1964), a case frequently cited for the proposition that transfusions may be
compelled, where the judge relies heavily on the fact that the patient was a mother:
"The patient, 25 years old, was the mother of a seven-month-old child. The state, as
parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it should not allow
this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments." Id. at 1008. Accord, United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), where a man was compelled to accept a
transfusion partly on the basis of his obligations to a wife and four children. But see
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944):
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease. . . .Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free in indenti-
cal circumstances to make martyrs of their children . . . . [emphasis
added].
,5 Raleigh Ritkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537
(N.J.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
7" In Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup.
Ct. 1965), the court ordered a transfusion administered to a mother of six based at least
partially on the court's sense of existentialism and moral guilt. The court explained,
How legalistic minded our society has become, and what an ultra-legalistic
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cumstance in which courts have intervened to compel transfu-
sions is that the patient is non compos mentis
77 or comatose.7 1
This is justified by the argument that an emergency exists, and
when the patient cannot make a rational decision, the safest
policy is to proceed with the transfusion.
In contrast, in cases without extenuating circumstances,
i.e. where the patient is a competent adult without minor chil-
dren, courts deciding the issue on the merits79 have upheld the
right to refuse transfusions. Such a decision was reached by the
Supreme Court of New York when they denied the application
of a hospital for an order authorizing a blood transfusion to a
Jehovah's Witness who had refused the transfusion." The court
noted that the patient had made a competent and calculated
decision, and even though suicide was a violation of the penal
law, he had a right to refuse the transfusion. Without relying
on the freedom of religion issue, the court decided the case on
maze we have created to the extent that society and the individual have
become enmeshed and paralyzed by its unrealistic entanglements!
I was reminded of "The Fall" by Camus, and I knew that no release-no legal
absolution-would absolve me or the Court from responsibility if I, speaking
for the Court, answered "No" to the question "Am I my brother's keeper?"
This woman wanted to live. I could not let her die!
Id. at 452.
17 See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the patient was "in extremis and hardly compos mentis
at the time in question; she was as little able competently to decide for herself as any
child would be." Id. at 1008; accord, United States v. George, 239 F.Supp. 752
(D.Conn. 1965), where the patient was diagnosed to be psychologically unstable at the
time.
7' Collins v. Davis, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
' These cases reaching the merits are few because the issue does not frequently
come up, and when it does, courts are reluctant to confront the issue on the merits.
They have developed a kind of doublebind treatment of the procedure involved which
successfully avoids the merits of the case. If the patient is in need of a transfusion,
which is usually an urgent need due to the nature of transfusions, courts will authorize
it on the theory that it's an emergency dictating a decision in favor of life because
there's no opportunity to give the problem the mature consideration it deserves. See
Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); United States v. George, 239 F.Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Colum-
bian Presbyterian Medical Center, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Subsequently,
once the transfusion has been administered, the question is magically moot. See Appli-
cation of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing
denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Thus there are few opportunities to litigate the
question fully.
"1 Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup.Ct. 1962). This case is noted in 33
FORDHAM L. REV. 513 (1965).
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the basis that "it is the individual who is the subject of a
medical decision who has the final say and . . . this must
necessarily be so in a system of government which gives the
greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance
of his own desires."
8'
A second court which decided the issue on the merits was
the Supreme Court of Illinois.2 There, the patient was compe-
tent and both of her children were adults. The court held that
transfusions could not be ordered by courts over the objections
of the individual because the first amendment "protects the
absolute right of every individual to freedom in his religious
belief and the exercise thereof, subject only to the qualification
that the exercise thereof may properly be limited by govern-
mental action where such exercise endangers, clearly and pres-
ently, the public health, welfare or morals."
Thus it would seem that while there is a split of authority
regarding society's right to force an individual to protect him-
self in the absence of a specific constitutional guarantee as is
the case with the helmet decisions, when a constitutional right
is involved, an adult is allowed the freedom to endanger his
own life if he is mentally competent and is without dependents.
B. The Development of State ex rel. Swann v. Pack
The controversy in State ex rel. Swann v. Pack4 grew out
of the distinctive religious practices of a fundamentalist sect in
the Tennessee mountains called The Holiness Church of God
in Jesus Name. As part of their religious ceremonies, members
of this sect drink strychnine and handle poisonous snakes. The
11 Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (Sup.Ct. 1962). Although the court did
not actually mention the freedom of religion issue, it was a consideration in their
decision to allow the individual to do as he chose.
" In re Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965). Although the transfusion in this
case had already been administered, the court dismissed the argument that the ques-
tion was moot and found that the issue presented fell within the well recognized
exception of cases presenting problems, which although technically moot were of sub-
stantial public interest and so required authoritative determination on appeal. Id. at
437-38.
" Id. at 441. See generally Note, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 190 (1965)(concluding that it
is unclear if the decision would have been different had the court used the "compelling
state interest" test instead of the "clear and present danger" test).
11 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1429 (1976).
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purpose of these practices is not to test a member's faith but
"to confirm the Word of God.
' 85
The case history of Swann is intricate. On April 14, 1973
the District Attorney General of the Second Judicial Circuit of
Tennessee filed a petition seeking to enjoin Pastor Pack and
certain Elders of The Holiness Church from "handling, dis-
playing or exhibiting poisonous snakes or taking or using stry-
chnine or other poisonous medicines." 6 A week later the Cir-
cuit Court in Newport, Tennessee granted an injunction based
on the Tennessee statute making snake handling a misde-
meanor.87 Although the statute forbidding snake handling was
the authority for the injunction, the trial judge also enjoined
the use of poison in church services. At the bottom of the in-
junction, the trial judge added in his own handwriting, "How-
ever, any person who wishes to swallow strychnine or other
poison may do so if he does not make it available to any other
persons."88
Apparently, the Holiness Church ignored the injunction
because the District Attorney General subsequently filed a sec-
ond petition alleging increased activity at the church. He con-
cluded that Cocke County, Tennessee was "in imminent dan-
ger and likely to 'become the snake handling capital of the
world.' """ In response to this, Pack and the Elders were held
in contempt, fined and sentenced. The sentences were sus-
pended, but when the defendants defaulted on payment of the
fines, they were directed to appear at a hearing and show cause
why they should not be imprisoned.
" Alfred Ball, a defendant in this suit, quoted in PELTON AND CARDEN, SNAKE
HANDLERS (1974) and cited in State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d at 106 (Tenn.
1975).
527 S.W.2d at 103.
'7 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1947). This statute provides,
Handling snakes so as to endanger life-Penalty. It shall be unlawful for any
person, or persons, to display, exhibit, handle or use any poisonous or dan-
gerous snake or reptile in such a manner as to endanger the life or health of
any person.
Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor . ...
The injunction read that the defendants were enjoined from "handling poisonous
snakes or using deadly poisons in any church service being conducted in said church
or at any other place in Cocke County, Tennessee. . . . 527 S.W.2d at 103.
1 527 S.W.2d at 104.
xv Id.
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At this hearing the trial judge issued a final decree perma-
nently enjoining the defendants from "handling, displaying or
exhibiting dangerous and poisonous snakes at the said Holiness
Church of God in Jesus Name, or at any other place in Cocke
County, Tennessee.""0 At this point, use of poison was dropped
from the injunction.
In a split decision, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found
the injunction to be overbroad and modified it to enjoin the
defendants from "handling, displaying or exhibiting dangerous
and poisonous snakes in such manner as will endanger the life
or health of persons who do not consent to exposure to such
danger."9' Thus the Court of Appeals injected a consenting
adult standard which would allow snake handling.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and found both
lower courts in error in restricting their injunctions to the terms
of the snake handling statute. While this was originally a crimi-
nal action for violation of a state statute, the court sponta-
neously changed the emphasis of the case and characterized it
instead as a suit by the District Attorney General to abate "a
common law nuisance, wholly independent of any state stat-
ute.""2 Thus both the previous injunctions were found to be
overly narrow, and the Tennessee Supreme Court ordered that
on remand,
the trial judge will enter an injunction perpetually enjoining
and restraining all parties respondent from handling, dis-
playing or exhibiting dangerous and poisonous snakes or from
consuming strychnine or any other poisonous substances,
within the confines of the State of Tennessee [emphasis
added] .
Thus any consumption of poison whatsoever was enjoined as a
common law public nuisance. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari for the case on March 8, 1976.11
, Id. at 105.
" Id. at 114. This consenting adult standard was apparently derived from the
language in the snake handling statute, reprinted note 87 supra.
,2 Id. at 113.
" Id. at 114.
, Pack v. Tennessee ex rel Swann, 96 S.Ct. 1429 (1976).
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C. The Approach in the Blood Transfusion Cases: A Better
Solution for Swann
The issue in the blood transfusion cases is closely analo-
gous to the issue in Swann in several important ways. First,
neither refusing a transfusion nor drinking poison even argua-
bly threatens direct harm to others; thus any danger to others
must arise from secondary harm. Second, the activity is pro-
scribed not by any legislative action but rather by judicial
action; thus the proscription lacks the familiar presumption of
constitutionality that attaches to statutes. 5 Third, the individ-
uals must be presumed to be motivated by sincere religious
convictions" based on Biblical passages. 7 Fourth, and most
significant, since the actions are a part of the individual's reli-
gious practices, they are protected by the first amendment.
While some distinctions between the blood transfusion cases
and the present case can be argued,9" they are relatively insig-
nificant and far outweighed by the similarities.
Yet the Swann case makes no mention of the blood trans-
fusion cases except for one case which has at best doubtful
precedental value.9 Basically, the court seems to accord the
, U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
While the sincerity of a particular religious practice is open to challenge, it is
not an issue in this case.
'7 The basis for the Jehovah's Witnesses' action is quoted in note 66 supra. The
Biblical passage regarding poison relied on by the members of the Holiness Church of
God in Jesus Name is Mark 16:18 (King James), which states,
They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not
hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover
[emphasis added].
'" There are two arguable distinctions. The first is that the blood transfusion cases
involve the staff of a hospital and doctors who are committed professionally and by
oath to maintaining life. Many of the transfusion cases have considered this involve-
ment as a factor in their decision to order a transfusion over the wishes of the individ-
ual. See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) and John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 279 A.2d
670 (N.J. 1971). The second possible distinction is that refusing blood is merely passive
behavior whereas drinking strychnine is active behavior.
" Tlhe case mentioned was Application of President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In this case, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia denied the hospital's application for permission to administer
a transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness when two attorneys appeared at the judge's
chambers, and without any formal complaint, application, or petition having been
filed, requested that the judge endorse the order for a transfusion they had in their
hands. The judge denied the application, and later the same day, the two attorneys
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poison issue brief treatment strictly as an analogy to suicide
although the two issues are clearly distinguishable."'0 Assuming
arguendo that the analogy is valid, poison drinking is still
treated with unseemly brevity.
Poison drinking is enjoined not on the basis of a statute
but as a common law public nuisance and as such it lacks the
showed up unannounced at the chambers of Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright. Judge
Wright went to the hospital and interviewed the patient's family, and to the extent
possible, the patient herself. He concluded that the patient didn't want to die, but she
didn't want to take responsibility for accepting the transfusion and thus betraying her
religious convictions. So Judge Wright then and there ordered the transfusion, thus
relieving the patient's conflict. In his opinion, he stresses the emergency nature of the
whole transaction, and states that, "It should be made clear that no attempt is being
made here to determine the merits of the underlying controversy." Id. at 1007. Later,
the Court sitting en banc denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Four separate
opinions were filed. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Washington stressed the
idea that their denial of a rehearing en banc was not to be interpreted as approving
the action in the matter sought to be reheard. In another concurring opinion, Circuit
Judge Danaher held he would dismiss for lack of a case or controversy. Two dissenting
opinions were filed. Circuit Judge Miller objected to the procedure of the action, which
he implied was totally improper. He stated,
. . . the purported orders [for the transfusion] should be expunged so there
would be nothing in our records which could be cited as a precedent for
future similar action by a single appellate judge.
Id. at 1010, 1014. This dissent was joined by Circuit Judges Bastion and Burger. A
second dissent was filed by Circuit Judge Burger, joined by Miller and Bastian, in
which Burger objected on the basis that the judicial power had been over-extended by
the order. He explained,
. . . we should. . . reconcile ourselves to the idea that there are myriads of
problems and troubles which judges are powerless to solve; and this is as it
should be. Some matters of essentially private concern and others of enor-
mous public concern, are beyond the reach of judges [emphasis added].
Id. at 1010, 1017-1018. At best then, the case had doubtful value as a precedent. See
also 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 706 (1964).
'® Suicide is an invalid analogy for two reasons. First, suicide requires intent to
kill oneself, and the individuals drinking strychnine certainly did not intend to destroy
themselves. They meant to confirm God's word. Second, the suicide analogy does not
take the motive for the behavior into account. While someone attempting suicide may
have any of a number of motives, the drinking of strychnine in this case was religiously
motivated, and as such is protected by the first amendment. But see dictum from
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878):
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose
one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,
would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he
lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously be-
lieved it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of her dead
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent
her carrying her belief into practice?
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presumption of constitutionality that attaches to statutes.,''
The court states that while suicide and attempted suicide are
not crimes under Tennessee statutes, they were crimes at com-
mon law, and since Tennessee adopted the common law, at-
tempted suicide is a grave public wrong.' 2 One question raised
by this reasoning is whether, since the Tennessee legislature
has not seen fit, as many states have, to classify suicide as any
type of crime,"'3 the court is justified in defining suicide as an
activity that requires restriction of first amendment freedom
by the police power. 104
The court goes on to state that, "Most assuredly. . . the
drinking of strychnine [is] not calculated to increase one's
lifespan.11I15 While this is undeniably a true statement, it di-
verts attention from the important issue. Although drinking
strychnine is not intended to increase one's lifespan (neither is
boxing, race car driving, mountain climbing, smoking, drink-
ing, overeating or a myriad of other activities commonly en-
gaged in), drinking strychnine is calculated in this case to ful-
fill a religious dictate. The critical issue is whether the religious
practice of drinking poison can legitimately be enjoined as a
common law public nuisance when it threatens no direct harm
to others and is, moreover, constitutionally guaranteed by the
" Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940):
Violation of an Act exhibiting such a legislative judgment and narrowly
drawn to prevent the supposed evil, would pose a question differing from that
we must here answer [footnote omitted]. Such a declaration of the State's
policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitu-
tional limitations. Here, however, the judgment is based on a common law
concept of the most general and undefined nature.
"1 527 S.W.2d at 113.
113 But cf. Cawley, supra note 31, at 68, who concludes that
• ..in those states where attempted suicide has been made lawful by statute
(or the lack of one), the refusal of necessary medical aid, whether equal to
or less than attempted suicide, must be conceded to be lawful.
"I Here the court has contradicted itself. While they feel confident in invoking the
police power on their own in this case, in their decision upholding statutory safety
regulations for motorcyclists, the same Tennessee court described the police power as
totally a legislative function:
It is a function of government solely within the domain of the Legislature to
declare when this [police] power shall be brought into operation, for the
protection or advancement of the public welfare.
Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 448 S.W.2d 408,
410 (Tenn. 1969).
10 527 S.W.2d at 113.
[Vol. 65
19761 COMMENTS
first amendment. The court never answers this question.
Finally, the court enumerates four alternatives to their
comprehensive injunction and gives the reason why none was
acceptable." 6 But these alternatives, presumably offered to
obviate the "less burdensome alternatives" argument, 07 are
directed solely at the prohibition against snake handling. Ap-
parently the court overlooked the most obvious alternative: a
distinction in treatment between the handling of snakes and
the drinking of poison.
It is likely that the court could have reached a better solu-
tion by distinguishing handling snakes from drinking stry-
chnine on the basis of the likelihood of direct harm to others. 0
"I The court stated:
We gave consideration to limiting the prohibition to handling snakes in the
presence of children, but rejected this approach because it conflicts with the
parental right and duty to direct the religious training of his children. We
considered the adoption of a "consenting adult" standard but, again, this
practice is too fraught with danger to permit its pursuit in the frenzied
atmosphere of an emotional church service, regardless of age or consent. We
considered restricting attendance to members only, but this would destroy
the evangelical mission of the church. We considered permitting only the
handlers themselves to be present, but this frustrates the purpose of confirm-
ing the faith to non-believers and separates the pastor and leaders from the
congregation. We could find no rational basis for limiting or restricting the
practice, and could conceive of no alternative plan or procedure which would
be palatable to the membership or permissible from a standpoint of compel-
ling state interest.
Id. at 114.
" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945).
Im It is conceivable that a snake might escape or lash out and thereby pose a direct
threat of harm to others, but this threat is absent when an individual drinks poison.
The trial judge in the principal case implicitly recognized this distinction, as he en-
joined the sect members from handling poisonous snakes or drinking deadly poisons
at any church services, but then added in his own handwriting at the bottom of the
injunction: "However, any person who wishes to swallow strychnine or other poison
may do so if he does not make it available to any other persons." 527 S.W.2d at 104.
Additionally, most of the states where this sect can be found have statutes against
snake handling which have been upheld by the courts. See Hill v. State, 88 So.2d 880
(Ala. 1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942); State v. Massey,
51 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1949) (city ordinance); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 409 (Va.
1947). However, none of these jurisdictions apparently felt the need to enact a statute
prohibiting the drinking of strychnine.
This distinction between handling snakes and drinking strychnine was made ex-
plicit by the Chief of Police of Durham, North Carolina, during an interstate conven-
tion of snakehandlers. As La Barre describes it in his book THEY SHALL TAKE Up
SERPENTS (1962), Police Chief H. E. King,
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The court could then have adopted the approach used by other
courts for handling Jehovah's Witnesses who declined blood
transfusions. Thus if the individual makes a competent choice
to drink strychnine and has no dependents, he would be free
to do so.
Besides providing the more just solution, this approach
would be more rationally grounded to the facts of this case. The
Holiness Church of God in Jesus Name is a small sect, and the
stipulations in the record show that it was "located about a half
mile from the nearest paved road, and at the end of a dead-end,
dirt, private, mountain road and on property owned by the
church."'' 9 To restrict the religious practices of this sect on the
ground that they constitute a "public nuisance" is a weak argu-
ment at best ' 0 and suggests an inability on the part of the court
to differentiate degrees of severity of threat to the public wel-
fare. The California Supreme Court was able to make such a
differentiation when they upheld the right of a small band of
Indians to consume peyote, even though it was a violation of
the penal law, because peyoteism was central to the practice
of their religion.' In the concluding paragraph of their opinion,
the California court states:
We know that some will urge that it is more important
to subserve the rigorous enforcement of the narcotic laws
than to carve out of them an exception for a few believers in
a strange faith. They will say that the exception may produce
problems of enforcement and that the dictate of the state
must overcome the beliefs of a minority of Indians. But the
problems of enforcement here do not inherently differ from
those of other situations which call for the detection of fraud.
On the other hand, the right to free religious expression em-
.... [Rieminded the public of the municipal ordinance against snake-
handling. He pointed out, however, that there was no law against people's
using blow-torches on themselves or taking strychnine or other poisons in
religious demonstrations, so long as they did not injure the health or lives of
other persons.
Id. at 35-36.
527 S.W.2d at 104.
"o The essence of a public nuisance is behavior that affects other citizens ad-
versely. See definition of a public nuisance, supra note 6. How an individual's drinking
poison could infringe on others' rights to the extent that the behavior would qualify as
a common law public nuisance is not explained by the court.
"I People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
[Vol. 65
COMMENTS
bodies a precious heritage of our history. In a mass society,
which presses at every point toward conformity, the protec-
tion of a self-expression, however unique, of the individual
and the group becomes evermore important. The varying cur-
rents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our
national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater
value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of
the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using
peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles,
California."
2
By taking the suggested approach to the situation in Swann,
the Tennessee Supreme Court also could have preserved the
greater value had they chosen not to enjoin the drinking of
strychnine by a small fundamentalist sect practicing their reli-
gion in the mountains of Tennessee.
Sarah N. Welling
112 Id. at 77-78, 394 P.2d at 821-22.
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